A New Approach to Delegation
Kenneth Culp Davist

The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. It has not
prevented the delegation of legislative power. Nor has it accomplished
its later purpose of assuring that delegated power will be guided by
meaningful standards. More importantly, it has failed to provide needed
protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power.
The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that the non-delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to protect
against arbitrary administrative power.
The non-delegation doctrine can and should be altered to turn it
into an effective and useful judicial tool. Its purpose should no longer
be either to prevent delegation of legislative power or to require
meaningful statutory standards; its purpose should be the much deeper
one of protecting against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary
power. The focus should no longer be exclusively on standards; it
should be on the totality of protections against arbitrariness, including
both safeguards and standards. The key should no longer be statutory
words; it should be the protections the administrators in fact provide,
irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say. The focus of judicial
inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards to administrative
safeguards and administrative standards. As soon as that shift is accomplished, the protections should grow beyond the non-delegation
doctrine to a much broader requirement, judicially enforced, that as
far as is practicable administrators must structure their discretionary
power through appropriate safeguards and must confine and guide
their discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules. The
requirement should extend not only to delegated power but also to
undelegated power, including especially the extremely important power
of selective enforcement, which probably engenders more injustice
than delegated power but which has always been almost altogether
beyond the reach of the non-delegation doctrine and of all other judicial doctrine designed to prevent or check arbitrariness.
The proposed changes are sweeping ones, for they will involve the
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courts in new and difficult undertakings. But the proposals are deeply
conservative in that they are designed to enlarge the judicial function
of protecting private parties against injustice. In the entire legal and
governmental system, the strongest need and the greatest promise for
improving the quality of justice to individual parties are in the areas
where decisions necessarily depend largely on discretion. In those areas
the role of the courts has been deficient. The essence of the proposed
changes is correction of the deficiency.
What follows is a discussion of (1) the failure of the non-delegation
doctrine, (2) three recent cases of major administrative policy-making
without meaningful statutory guidance, (3) why the non-delegation
doctrine has failed, (4) judicial acquiescence in administrative exercise
of ungranted power, without safeguards or standards, and in contravention of legislative intent, (5) how to alter the non-delegation doctrine
to make it effective and useful, and (6) the future-non-delegation,
due process, and common law.
I. THE FAILURE OF THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
The original purpose of the non-delegation doctrine was to prevent
the delegation of legislative power. As recently as 1932 the Supreme
Court declared: "That the legislative power of Congress cannot be
delegated is, of course, clear."1 With only a little realism the Court
could have said that for a century and a half it had been, of course, clear
that legislative power of Congress could be delegated and that it often
had been delegated. Delegated power was then being exercised throughout the government. What was shortly to become the huge Code of
Federal Regulations was obviously a product of delegated legislative
power.
The 1932 statement was an anachronistic statement of an earlier
attitude. The later purpose, already well along in its life cycle, was to
require meaningful standards when power was delegated: "Congress
cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the
limitation of a prescribed standard." 2 The doctrine has clearly failed
to accomplish this later purpose. For instance, when a lower court
faithfully applied the Supreme Court's supposed requirement of meaningful standards to a statute which was wholly empty of standards even
I United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932). This article
does not undertake a systematic statement of the law of delegation. For that, see 1 K.C.
DAvis, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW TREATIS

ch. 2, §§ 2.01-.16 (1958, Supp. 1965). Beyond the

scope of the present discussion is the combination of the non-delegation doctrine with
other principles, such as those growing out of the first amendment, as in Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
2 United States v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & P.R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931).
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though administrators were imposing a death sentence on a sizable
business, the Supreme Court reversed, without pretending to find statutory standards.3 The Supreme Court apparently knew that an insistence
upon meaningful statutory standards was no longer feasible.
II.

THREE RECENT CASES OF MAJOR ADMINISTRATVE
POLICY-MAKING WITHOUT MEANINGFUL
STATUTORY GUIDANCE

The failure of the non-delegation doctrine can best be seen in cases
that do not directly deal with delegation problems. Major governmental
policy is often administratively made without significant statutory
guidance. Perhaps three hundred cases could be summarized to show
the existence of this phenomenon. Three outstanding ones have been
selected, each of which shows exercise of regulatory power over a vital
subject matter of large dimensions, even though Congress at the time
of the enactment knew nothing of the subject and could have had no
intent of any kind with respect to it. In each of the three cases the whole
policy of the government on the particular subject was made by the
agency without guidance from Congress.
The three cases are United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,4 upholding the Federal Communications Commission's CATV regulations,
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway,5 upholding the Interstate Commerce Commission's "piggyback" regulations, and PermianBasin Area Rate Cases," upholding the
Federal Power Commission's area price fixing for natural gas.
The Southwestern Cable case upheld the FCC's regulation of CATV
3 Fahey v. Mallonee, 382 U.S. 245 (1947), rev'g 68 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Cal. 1946). Even
at an early time, delegations without standards were sustained. St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908); McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919).
The Immigration and Nationality Act contains scores of delegations of discretionary
power, most of them without standards of any kind. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1964). So do
many other statutes.
An argument that the non-delegation doctrine must be deemed successful because nearly
all delegations are in fact accompanied by standards or clarification of legislative purpose
is unconvincing because the reason that legislative bodies usually state standards or clarify
their purpose is that they choose to govern to that extent, not that the non-delegation
doctrine so requires. The test of success or failure of the non-delegation doctrine is what
happens when the legislative body is unable or unwilling to state standards or to clarify
its purpose.
For an excellent presentation of the view, here rejected, that presence or absence of
standards is and should be the crucial consideration on all problems of delegation, see
Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. REv.
469 (1968).
4 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
5 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
6 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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(community antenna television), which did not exist when the Communications Act was enacted in 1934. The Commission during the early
period of CATV took the position that it had no power to regulate it,
and unsuccessfully sought a congressional grant of authority. Then, beginning in 1960, it gradually asserted authority to regulate, and it finally
issued elaborate rules, pursuant to which it issued an order restricting
expansion of a particular CATV service. The Ninth Circuit struck
down the order on the ground that the Commission lacked authority
to regulate CATV, but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The
Court found the necessary authority in a provision that the Act was
applicable to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio,"7 and in a requirement that the Commission endeavor to "make
available.., to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service," s
even though the Court granted that "Certainly Congress could not in
1934 have foreseen the development of community antenna television
systems." 9
Addressing itself to the scope of the Commission's authority, the
Court said the authority to regulate CATV was "restricted to that
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.
The Commission may, for these purposes, issue 'such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent
with law,' as 'public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' 47 U.
S. C. § 303(r)."'10
The reality seems abundantly clear that the Commission has power
to regulate CATV in any reasonable way it finds to be in the public
interest. The resulting law stems from the Commission, not from
Congress and not from the courts, except that congressional committees
may supervise and the courts may keep the Commission within constitutional and statutory limitations. The congressional power has been
effectively delegated to the Commission, without meaningful standards.
A half-hearted argument by Southwestern Cable that "the attempted
delegation is unconstitutional for lack of standards"" was not even
mentioned by the Court. The argument apparently was deemed so lacking in merit as not even to deserve a judicial statement that it was
rejected.
392 U.S. at 167.
Id.
9 Id. at 172.
10 Id. at 178.
1l Brief for Respondents at 36, 392 US. 157.
7
8
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The American Trucking case dealt with the ICC's regulation of the
"piggyback" system (trailer on flatcar). The Commission's policy for
twenty-five years had been to interpret the Interstate Commerce Act and
Motor Carrier Act as withholding power to require railroads to carry
the trailers or containers of their competitors, the motor carriers.
During that period the ICC unsuccessfully sought authorization from
Congress so to require. Then the Commission assumed the necessary
power and issued comprehensive rules. The Court held, with seemingly
the greatest of ease, that the Commission had the necessary authority,
including the authority to change its position. The Court declared that
"we agree that the Commission, faced with new developments or in
light of reconsideration of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter
its past interpretation and overturn past administrative rulings and
practice.'

12

Of course, Congress had not laid down meaningful standards to guide
the regulation of "piggyback" service, for Congress had not even dealt
with that subject. But the Court held that the National Transportation
Policy was "the yardstick by which the correctness of the Commission's
actions will be measured."' 13 The result is that the system must be "fair
and impartial"'14 and must be "adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense."'15 Within that exceedingly broad framework, the whole policy
with respect to "piggyback" service has to come from the Commission,
not at all from the statutes.
The PermianBasin case is even more impressive in showing that the
most vital administrative determinations may be made without meaningful statutory guidance. From the time the Natural Gas Act was enacted in 1938, the Federal Power Commission assumed that it had no
authority to regulate sales by independent producers to interstate pipelines. But the Supreme Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,16 that the Commission had such authority, and the Commission
then tried to regulate under what the Court in the Permian opinion
called "an ill-suited statute."'u The traditional system of regulation of
individual companies under a costs-of-service standard proved unworkable. Then, with no statutory guides other than the term "just and reasonable," the Commission in 1960 started a program of fixing maximum
rates for each of the major producing areas. The statute contained
12 387 U.S. at 416.

13 Id. at 421.
14 Id.
15

Id.

16 547 U.S. 672 (1954).
17 390 U.S. at 756.
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nothing about area rate fixing. The entire system had to be created by
the Commission. The Court held that area rate fixing was not inconsistent with the statute, that it was constitutional, that the rate structure
adopted by the Commission was valid, and that the Commission's action
was valid in other challenged particulars. The Court sensibly emphasized that "the breadth and complexity of the Commission's responsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable opportunity to
formulate methods of regulation appropriate for the solution of its
intensely practical difficulties. 1 8s The Court even explicitly acknowledged that "neither law nor economics has yet devised generally accepted standards for the evaluation of rate-making orders."' 9 The Court
went on to create its own law as to the criteria for review-whether
the Commission abused or exceeded its authority, whether each of the
order's essential elements was supported by substantial evidence, and
"whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors
for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection
to the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable." 20 If
the statute lacks the criteria for area rate regulation, the Commission
must invent them, and the Court will then invent the guides for judicial review of what the Commission establishes Despite the silence of
the statute on issue after issue, the Court's 101-page opinion is filled
with such conclusions as "we are constrained to hold that this was a
permissible exercise of the Commission's discretion."2 1
The basic approach of the Court was to make the overall judgment
that Congress intended comprehensive regulation of natural gas, and
then to reason from that judgment to the conclusion that area rate
regulation must have been authorized. This approach became explicit
on one point when the Court declared: "We are, in the absence of
compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention, unwilling to
prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an
agency's ultimate purposes." 22 That this proposition reaches beyond
the natural gas field is shown by the Court's quotation of it in its
Southwestern Cable opinion to sustain the CATV regulations. 23 Essentially the same thought was expressed in the "piggyback" case: "In the
absence of congressional direction, there is no basis for denying to the
18 Id.

at 790.

19 Id.

20 Id.

at 792.

21 Id. at 798.
22 Id. at 780.
23 392 U.S. at 177.

1969]

Delegation

ICC the power to allocate and regulate transportation that partakes
of both elements [rail and truck]

....

,24

Of course, even though in each of the three cases no power over the
specific subject matter had been expressly delegated, and even though
no meaningful standards were applicable to the specific subject matter
in any of the three instances, still the established framework of regularized procedural protections and judicial review was necessarily a
major force in each of the three cases. Within such a framework, the
exercise of delegated power on vital subjects without meaningful standards may be good government. At all events, the Supreme Court
shows very clearly that it thinks it is.
III. WHY THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE HAs FAILED

The original objective of preventing the delegation of legislative
power and the later objective of requiring every delegation to be
accompanied by meaningful statutory standards had to fail, should
have failed, and did fail.
The courts should never have aimed at either objective. Not only
is delegation without meaningful standards a necessity for today's governments at all levels but such delegation has been deemed a necessity
from the time the United States was founded, as anyone can quickly
confirm by examining the statutes enacted by the Ist Congress, which
was made up largely of the same men who wrote the Constitution.
The 1st Congress did not bother with standards when it delegated to
the courts the power "to make and establish all necessary rules for the
orderly conducting of business in the said courts, provided such rules
are not repugnant to the laws of the United States," 25 when it delegated to district courts power to impose "whipping, not exceeding
thirty stripes," without a guiding standard,2 6 when it provided for
military pensions "under such regulations as the President of the
United States may direct," 2 7 when it authorized the President to fix
the pay, not more than prescribed maxima, for military personnel
wounded or disabled in the line of duty,28 when it conferred discre-

tionary power upon the Secretary of the Treasury to mitigate or remit fines and forfeitures in designated circumstances, without requiring him to mitigate or remit.29 Nor did the Ist Congress define the
24 387 US. at 421.
25 Judiciary Act of

1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.

26 Id. at 77.
27
28
29

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 95.
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 11, 1 Stat. 119, 121.
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 128.
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word "proper" in authorizing superintendents to license "any proper
person" to engage in trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes; it
provided no standard to guide the President in providing that such
superintendents "shall be governed in all things touching the said
trade and intercourse, by such rules and regulations as the President
shall prescribe."30
Of course, today's governmental undertakings are much more complex and the need for delegated power without meaningful standards
is much more compelling. A modern regulatory agency would probably
be an impossibility if power could not be delegated with vague standards. Typically, a regulatory agency must decide many major questions that could not have been anticipated at the time of the statutory
enactment; typically, legislators are unable to write meaningful standards that will be helpful in answering such major questions; and typically, the protections lie much less in standards than in frameworks
of procedural safeguards plus executive, legislative, or judicial checks.
The main facts about any regulatory agency can be used to illustrate
what has just been said. Let us choose the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, as modified by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 31 Congress left
open the fundamental problem of the extent to which competition
should be allowed or required, by directing the Board to "consider,"
among other items, "competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted
to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. '32 The statutory words did not answer the question whether or when to allow
monopoly, whether or when to certificate two carriers for one route,
or whether or when to certificate more than two.
Congress also left open many other major questions of policy. A
mere listing of samples of such questions will show how much discretionary power was necessarily conferred upon the Board: Of the eleven
domestic trunklines, the big four at first had about 70 per cent of the
business; should they be further strengthened or should the smaller
trunklines be strengthened? Should new trunklines be allowed entry,
or should all major routes be divided among the existing eleven?
Should trunklines be allowed to provide local service? Should they be
required to? Should the Board compel service which a carrier does not
voluntarily provide? Should local-service lines be allowed to compete
with trunklines? Should the service of local-service lines and of trunk30

Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137.

31 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
32

Id. § 1302(a).
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lines be kept separate or should it be mixed? Should certificates for
local-service lines be for limited periods only or should they be permanent? Should all-cargo carriers be certificated to compete with the
trunklines which carry cargo? Should all-cargo carriers be eligible for
subsidies? Should they be authorized to carry mail? Should the allcargo carriers have the exclusive right to sell "blocked space" (reduced
rates for specified space for designated periods)? Should nonscheduled
carriers be exempt from regulation? Can an unregulated system of
nonscheduled carriers be made compatible with a regulated system of
scheduled carriers? What activities should be classified as nonscheduled? What consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of control are
"consistent with the public interest"? What are the factors that should,
determine what transfers of certificates of convenience and necessity
are in the public interest? In the statutory system of basing air mail
pay on "need" of the carrier, does a carrier's profit from sale of a
route reduce its "need"? Does profit from nontransportation service
reduce a carrier's "need"? In finding "need," what rate of return on
investment should be allowed? To what extent may mail pay rates be
made retroactive? Should mail rates be of two kinds-a rate based on
"need," and a rate based on cost of service when subsidy is inappropriate? When two or more carriers of mail between two cities have
different rates, may the Post Office Department allocate mail to the
carrier whose rates are lowest, or must the Board make the mail rates
the same for carriers whose "need" differs? May the Board fix mail
rates for classes of carriers or must the rates be fixed for each carrier
separately? In what circumstances should the Board fix minimum rates
to check competition which causes operating losses? When may promotional or developmental rates below the cost of service be justified?
Should the rate base be actual investment or cost of reproduction?
Should the rate of return be the same for fixing mail pay as for fixing
fares? Can fares be varied so as to stabilize annual earnings? If the
fare level is fixed on the basis of earnings of the whole industry, should
high-cost carriers receive mail subsidies or should they raise fares on
noncompetitive lines above the industry level?
The foregoing questions do seem to involve major policy. Yet Congress in the statute gave no clear answer to any of these questions.
Statutory provisions and legislative history have some bearing on many
of the questions but in no instance enough to foreclose administrative
discretion.
The reason for committing major policy questions to the Board's
discretion was that someone had to answer them, the courts were illequipped to do so, and Congress was neither equipped nor willing. A
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statute requiring judges to make regulatory policies would probably
unconstitutionally violate the principle of separation of powers. Although Congress could not conceivably anticipate all the major policy
questions, it could conceivably legislate on each question as it arose.
But Congress has neither time nor inclination for that. As for time,
Congress during 1938 enacted public laws filling 1,258 pages of the
statutes at large, and the provisions on air carrier economic regulation
fill only 18 pages; Congress or its committees considered ten or twenty
times as much proposed legislation that was not enacted. As for inclination, should any authority other than the electorate try to require
Congress to legislate in greater detail than it is inclined to? The degree
of delegation should depend upon legislative appraisals of the need for
delegation and of comparative qualifications of legislators and administrators. Even the Internal Revenue Code, said to be our most detailed federal legislation, contains more than a thousand express delegations, and through vague or inadequate language perhaps thousands
more.
Staffs attached to committees of Congress could conceivably do all
that the CAB and its staff now do, and everything that is done could
be put through the legislative mill, so that all policies would be determined by statutory enactments. Even if such a system were feasible for
one or a few fields of governmental activity, it could not be feasible
for all. An individual congressman could not possibly follow even the
general nature of more than a tiny portion of all the discretionary action now taken by more than 2,500,000 federal civilian employees.
IV.

JuDcIAI. AcQUxESCENCE IN ADMiNISTRATrvE EXERC SE OF

UNGRANTED POWER, WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS OR STANDARDS,
AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Extremely incongruous is the non-delegation doctrine when placed
alongside a dominant feature of the American legal system-the prevalence of the ungranted and usually uncontrolled power of selective enforcement. The courts keep repeating and repeating that the exercise
of delegated power must be guided by meaningful safeguards even
when the delegated power is carefully circumscribed and even when
the intent to delegate is based upon a fully-considered judgment that
the delegation is necessary and desirable, but at the same time the
same courts acquiesce in the assumption by police, prosecutors, regulatory agencies, licensing agencies, and other administrators of the
enormous power of selective enforcement, which is (a) not only unguided by statutory standards but often exercised in direct violation
of dearly expressed legislative intent, (b) typically unguided even by
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administrative standards, (c) typically unprotected by procedural safeguards, (d) typically exercised by subordinate officers with little or no
supervision, and (e) typically immune to judicial review even when
denial of equal justice can be readily shown.
The discretionary power to enforce or not to enforce is one of the
most crucial powers of all, even though it is typically unprotected
either by standards or by safeguards or by judicial review. When the
evidence against a potential respondent is clear, the choice of the enforcement officer to act or not to act may be the only one that counts,
because a decision to enforce may almost automatically lead to application of sanctions, and a decision not to enforce is likely to be final
for it is likely to be neither administratively nor judicially reviewable.
Yet the discretionary power to enforce or not to enforce seems to be
of little or no concern to the courts, which characteristically acquiesce
when a prosecutor fully enforces one statute, never enforces a second
statute, and picks and chooses in enforcing a third. The courts have
no concern for either standards or safeguards when such agencies as
the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission enforce
some facets of the antitrust laws but not others; they may even prosecute for slight violations and let the serious ones go. No requirement
of standards or of safeguards or of equal justice prevents the Antitrust
Division from moving against one conglomerate because of its reciprocity power and undue concentration, while doing nothing about a
half-dozen much larger conglomerates with greater reciprocity power
and more concentration. And the courts even seem to be indifferent
to the denial of equal protection when the police capriciously arrest
one out of six violators, even if he can prove that he is the one of the
six who is least deserving of arrest.
Such power to enforce or not to enforce is not limited to prosecutors
and police. A state public service commission or a federal regulatory
agency may institute a proceeding against Company X for a rate reduction but not against Company Y, and the crucial determination
may be protected neither by standards nor by safeguards. Similarly, a
licensing agency may reprimand a big violator but institute revocation
proceedings against a small one. A public housing manager may overlook offenses by some tenants but quickly move to evict others. Administrators of many other kinds exercise the largely unnecessary and
mostly uncontrolled power of selective enforcement.
The kind of injustice that is easiest to identify as injustice may be
unequal treatment of like cases, or treatment of one whose offense is
greater more favorably than one whose offense is less. For instance, if
A is much more deserving of prosecution than B, if carrying out the
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legislative will dearly requires the prosecution of A, and if equal justice is flagrantly violated by prosecuting B and letting A go, the prosecuting agencies, under the established system in which the courts customarily acquiesce, are nevertheless typically free to prosecute B but
not A. The failure to prosecute A is not a defense in B's case, even if
the denial of equal justice is flagrant, even if it is motivated by political or personal or other ulterior influence, and even if the failure to
prosecute A is in direct contravention of what the legislative body
clearly intended. Typically, the discretionary determination to prosecute B but not A is unguided by standards and unprotected by safeguards, and yet it is almost always judicially unreviewable 3 Neither
the non-delegation doctrine nor any other doctrine will help B, even
though the power has been arbitrarily exercised, even though B has
been denied equal justice, even though no statutory or other standards
guide the determination to prosecute B but not A, and even though
the discretionary determination is wholly unprotected by procedural
or other safeguards.
What a queer system in which (a) the judges in hundreds of opinions keep paying lip service to the proposition that delegations of
power are unlawful unless guided by meaningful statutory standards
and (b) at the same time enforcement officers of many kinds at all
levels freely exercise an ungranted discretionary power to move against
those who are less deserving of prosecution and to do nothing about
those who are more deserving of prosecution, even when the discretionary power is unguided by statutory or other standards and directly
violates clearly expressed legislative intent. More sensible would be a
system that in both respects would be exactly the opposite-allowing
delegations without meaningful statutory standards, but disallowing
the unguided and unchecked power of selective enforcement. Still
more sensible would be a system designed for proper control of all
discretionary power.
33 Systematic discrimination, if it can be shown, may be a ground for review. Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But capricious action is not enough. Cf. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953). See W. LAFAVE, Aaaxsr 161-3 (1965); Comment, The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUm. L. Rav. 1103 (1961)
(containing a good collection of authorities and a skillful analysis).
Decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute are almost always unreviewable. See, e.g.,
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Of course, a judicial trial is an
acceptance of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute, not a review of it. A rare case of review of a decision to prosecute is Universal-Rundle Corp. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 244 (1967); another such highly exceptional case,
emphasizing the tradition, is People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 252 N.YS.2d 96, 200
N.E.2d 779 (1964), conviction rev'd, 50 Misc. 2d 751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
For an argument that prosecutors' decisions should be judicially reviewable, see K.C.
DAvis, DM.ONARY JusTicE 207-14 (1969).
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The foundations of the system into which we have drifted are much
in need of reexamination.
V. How

TO ALTER THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE

TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AND USEFUL

Five principal steps should be taken to alter the non-delegation doctrine and to move toward a system of judicial protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power: (a) the purpose of the
non-delegation doctrine should no longer be either to prevent delegation or to require meaningful statutory standards; the purpose should
be the much deeper one of protecting against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power; (b) the exclusive focus on standards should
be shifted to an emphasis more on safeguards than on standards; (c)
when legislative bodies have failed to provide standards, the courts
should not hold the delegation unlawful but should require that the
administrators must as rapidly as feasible supply the standards; (d) the
non-delegation doctrine should gradually grow into a broad requirement extending beyond the subject of delegation-that officers with
discretionary power must do about as much as feasible to structure
their discretion through appropriate safeguards and to confine and
guide their discretion through standards, principles, and rules; (e) the
protection should reach not merely delegated power but also such undelegated power as that of selective enforcement. Each of these five
proposals will now be elaborated.
(a) The basic purpose of the traditional non-delegation doctrine is
unsatisfactory and should be changed. It should no longer be either to
prevent delegation of legislative power or to require meaningful statutory standards. The purpose should be to do what can be done through
such a doctrine to protect private parties against injustice on account
of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power.
Looking backwards, one may appreciate an observation by the Supreme Court in 1825 in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall:
Congress may certainly delegate... powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.

. .

. The line has not

been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects,
which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may
be made, and power given to those who are to act under such

general provisions to fill up the details. 3 4

The most important questions are for the legislature, and its purpose
34 Wayman v. Southard, 23 US. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
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must be discernible either through what it says or from the nature of
the subject and circumstances, but when those requirements are satisfied, delegation is permissible, says the 1825 Court. That formulation
may be sounder than what has come later-the overworked notion
that in any and all delegations some "standards" must be stated.
The purpose spun in recent opinions is unfortunate both in what
it attempts and in what it fails to attempt. The courts should assert
that legislative bodies do and should delegate, not that they are forbidden to. They should assert that putting the content of the Code of
Federal Regulations through the congressional enacting process would
mean worse government, not better government, because Congress is
and should be geared to major policies and main outlines, and administrators are better able to legislate the relative details, sometimes including even major policy determinations. The courts should recognize that administrative legislation through the superb rule-making
procedure marked out by the Administrative Procedure Act often provides better protection to private interests than congressional enactment of detail.
Affirmatively, the courts need to do much more than they have
been doing through the non-delegation doctrine to provide protection
against arbitrariness. This observation will be fully implemented in
the ensuing discussion.
(b) Safeguards are usually more important than standards, although
both may be important. The criterion for determining the validity of
a delegation should be the totality of the protection against arbitrariness, not just the one strand having to do with statutory standards.
For instance, a delegation without standardsof power to make rules
in accordance with proper rule-making procedure and a delegation
without standards of power to work out policy through case-to-case
adjudication based on trial-type hearings should normally be sustained,
whenever the general legislative purpose is discernible. The risk of arbitrary or unjust action is much greater from informal discretionary
action, but even there the protection from safeguards is likely to be
more effective than protection from standards. For instance, if one administrator in exercising discretionary power without hearings uses a
system of open findings, open reasons, and open precedents, but another who is also acting without hearings never states findings or reasons and never uses precedents as a guide, the delegation to the first
administrator is much more deserving of judicial support than the delegation to the second.
During the past decade the courts have been moving toward the use
of safeguards and away from the use of standards as the test for valid-
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ity of delegations. This movement seems to stem from a 1958 analysis
of the law of delegation, emphasizing procedural safeguards rather
than standards. 35 One of the earliest cases to use the new approach was
Warren v. Marion County,3 6 asserting without qualification:
There is no constitutional requirement that all delegation
of legislative power must be accompanied by a statement of
standards circumscribing its exercise. It is true that a contrary
view has frequently been expressed in the adjudicated cases,
particularly the earlier ones, but the position taken in such
cases is not defensible. It is now apparent that the requirement of expressed standards has, in most instances, been little
more than a judicial fetish for legislative language, the recitation of which provides no additional safeguards to persons
affected by the exercise of the delegated authority. .

.

. As

pointed out in Davis on Administrative Law, the important
consideration is not whether the statute delegating the power
expresses standards, but whether the procedure established
for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safeguards
37
to those who are affected by the administrative action.
A good many state courts have been following that lead in emphasizing safeguards instead of standards."8 One basic need of the non35 1 K.C. DAvis, A lDMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATiSE §§ 2.08, 2.15 (1958).
36 222 Ore. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (1960).
37 Id. at 313-4, 353 P.2d at 261.
38 A few examples: The California Supreme Court has emphasized that the need is
usually for safeguards rather than for standards, but the opinion also contains a good
deal of unrealism, such as the statement that legislative power "is vested exclusively in
the legislature, and cannot be delegated by it." Kugler v. Yocum, - Cal. 2d -, 445 P.2d
303, 306, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687, 690 (1968). Upholding a delegation, the Iowa court declared:
"We have always held to the adequate standards or guidelines test . . . but we agree
the presence or absence of procedural safeguards is important .... " Elk Run Tel. Co.
v. Gen. Tel. Co., - Iowa -, 160 N.V.2d 311, 317 (1968). In Butler v. United Cerebral
Palsy, Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961), a statute with no standards authorizing establishment and operation of schools for "exceptional children" was sustained, on the basis of
what the court called an examination "in terms of safeguards against abuse and injustice." Id. at 208. The holding was relied upon in sustaining a statute without standards
delegating authority to grant or refuse permission "to place or receive a child" for adoption. Commonwealth v. Lorenz, 407 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1966). A New Jersey court found
standards adequate and then declared: "Additionally, a defendant has the benefit of
adequate procedural safeguards. It has been said that standards are not as important as
are procedural safeguards and outside checks upon discretionary power." The court went
on to analyze the safeguards. Dep't of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100
NJ. Super. 366, 385, 242 A.2d 21, 31 (Super. Ct. 1968). The court emphasized "presence
or absence of procedural safeguard" in upholding a delegation in Schmidt v. Dep't of
Resource Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 58, 158 N.W.2d 306, 313 (1968).
Sustaining a standard as adequate, a federal court realistically said that "The Constitution does not prohibit delegation. . . . [I)t would be impossible for Congress to determine beforehand those drugs to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied
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delegation doctrine is for further spread of this movement. What is
needed is not simply a substitution of a requirement of safeguards for
a requirement of standards but a consideration of both safeguards and
standards in order to determine whether the total protection against
arbitrary power is adequate.
(c) The crucial consideration is not what the statute says but what
the administrators do. The safeguards that count are the ones the administrators use, not the ones mentioned in the statute. The standards
that matter are the ones that guide the administrative determination,
not merely the ones stated by the legislative body. The test should accordingly be administrative safeguards and standards, not statutory
safeguards and standards.3 9
Accordingly, the proposal has recently been advanced that "the
courts should continue their requirement of meaningful standards,
except that when the legislative body fails to prescribe the required
standards the administrators should be allowed to satisfy the require40
ment by prescribing them within a reasonable time."
and to formulate specific rules for each situation," and that "Another suggested approach,
perhaps a similar one, is that the validity of delegation be tested more on the basis
of safeguards rather than standards." Iske v. United States, 396 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir.
1968).
39 A recent Illinois decision, Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R., 41 Ill. 2d 245, 242 N.E.2d
152 (1968), is a good one for illustrative purposes. The statute prohibited signs or billboards on any state highway "other than as may be directed by the authority having
jurisdiction over such highway." ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 121, § 9-112 (1965). The authority
with such jurisdiction was the City of Chicago. Speaking of "a naked grant of discretionary power unaccompanied by any standards," 41 Ill. 2d at 254, 242 N.E.2d at 156,
the court held the statute "an impermissible delegation of legislative authority." Id. at
256, 242 N.E.2d at 157. The result is that the legislative intent to prohibit signs on highways was thwarted until the legislature could act again. Should not the court have
saved the statute and at the same time have protected against arbitrary exercise of the
delegated power? The court might have held that power of city officers, unguided either
by statutory standards or by their own announced standards or rules, is impermissible,
but that if officers do about as much as they feasibly can do in adopting standards or
rules to guide determinations in particular cases, that is all that is required. The subject matter the legislature has intended to regulate thus would not go unregulated, but
at the same time affected parties would be protected against what the court called "arbitrary power to make exceptions." Id. at 252, 242 N.E.2d at 156.
Whatever awkwardness might be involved in disposing of the specific case along the
line suggested would usually be avoided as soon as the law would become clear that
the court would allow either the legislative body or the administrators to supply the
required standards. Any administrator, threatened with a challenge on the ground of
invalid delegation, would normally supply the required standards before the court so
orders. As soon as the new system would become fully operative, all the significant in
terests would be amply protected: The legislative body would not be required to write
standards it is ill-prepared and disinclined to write; the standards or rules would be
formulated by the administrators, under threat of judicial compulsion; private parties
would be protected from arbitrary action which can and should be guided by standards; and normally litigation to produce these desirable results would be unnecessary.
40 K.C. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTICE 58 (1969) (italics in original omitted).
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When an administrator is making a discretionary determination affecting a private party, standards which have been adopted through
administrative rule-making are just as effective in confining and guiding the discretionary determination as would be standards stated in
the statute. They are not only as effective but in one important aspect
they are better. The weakness of a judicial requirement of statutory
standards is that legislators are often unable or unwilling to supply
them. The strength of a judicial requirement of administrative standards is that, with the right kind of judicial prodding, the administrators can be expected to supply them. To the extent that the objective is to require standards to guide discretionary determinations in
cases affecting particular parties, that objective can be better attained
through judicial insistence that administrators create the standards
through rule-making than by judicial insistence upon statutory standards. Legislative bodies should clarify their purposes to the extent
that they are able and willing to do so, but when they choose to delegate without standards, the courts should uphold the delegation whenever the needed standards to guide particular determinations have
41
been supplied through administrative rules or policy statements.
(d) Another strength in the idea that the courts should require administrative standards whenever statutory standards are inadequate is
that the idea opens the way for courts to give more attention to the
manner in which administrators confine and structure their discretionary power. The requirement of administrative standards will and
should naturally grow into a somewhat larger requirement-that administrators must do what they reasonably can do to develop and to
make known the needed confinements of their discretionary power
through not only standards but also principles and rules. In other
words, the non-delegation doctrine will evolve into a broad system of
judicial protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary
power. The judicial undertaking will be a large and difficult one, but
the courts have often accepted other such self-assigned tasks and have
seen them through.
(e) Shifting the non-delegation doctrine to a judicially-enforced requirement that administrators must do what they reasonably can do
to develop and to make known the needed confinements of their discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules, as well as
41 A provocative idea is that a legislative body may properly choose to delegate discretionary power to one agency, to be exercised in conformity with standards and procedures to be prescribed by a second agency. Somewhat more complex is a federal
statute along this line, providing that the Water Resources Council "shall establish . . .
principles, standards and procedures for Federal participants in the preparation of comprehensive regional or river basin plans ... " National Water Commission Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1962a-2 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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to structure their power through procedural safeguards, will open the
way for a judicial requirement that will reach not only delegations of
power but also assumptions of undelegated power, including especially
the enormous power of selective enforcement.
In broad perspective, the American legal system has become one in
which courts usually strive to protect citizens against injustice at the
hands of any public officers except enforcement officers. No one has
planned the exception. No one would. It is the product of long-term
drift. Injustice at the hands of any public officer should be subject to
judicial correction, whenever the issues are appropriate for judicial
determination. This means, more specifically, that injustice from police, prosecutors, regulatory agencies, licensing agencies, and any other
administrators in the exercise of initiating and prosecuting powers
should be subject to judicial correction.
The ideal of "equal justice under law" can and should be extended
to the initiating and prosecuting functions, so as to correct an outstanding flaw in the basic system of American justice.
VI. THE

FUTURE-NON-DELEGATION,

DUE PROCESS, AND COMMON LAW

As the courts shift the non-delegation doctrine from a requirement
of statutory standards to a requirement of administrative standards
and safeguards, then shift further to a broad requirement that administrators do what they reasonably can do to structure and confine their
discretionary powers through safeguards, standards, principles, and
rules, and as that requirement in turn is extended to apply to the
huge powers of initiating and prosecuting, including selective enforcement, what has started out as a non-delegation doctrine will grow into
something that will reach well beyond delegation. The non-delegation
doctrine will merge with the concept of due process and may perhaps
move from a constitutional base to a common-law base.
Although what has just been suggested may seem to involve more
imagination than facts, the basic movement has already begun. Some
courts have already ignored the absence of statutory standards and
have held that due process forbids the administrators to exercise their
discretionary power in particular cases without first creating administrative standards or guides. The further development of this idea
seems inevitable, because as soon as it is understood, it has strong appeal.
Let us examine three illustrative cases. The outstanding one is
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority.42 The Authority re42 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
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ceived 90,000 applications annually but could admit only 10,000 families to public housing. Except for some preference candidates, "Applications... are not processed chronologically, or in accordance with
ascertainable standards, or in any other reasonable and systematic
manner." 43 Each application expired after two years, a renewed application stood no better than a first application of the same 'date, no
open waiting list was used, determinations of ineligibility were not
made known to applicants, and many applications were never considered by the Authority. The complaint charged that "these procedural
defects increase the likelihood of favoritism, partiality, and arbitrariness."' 44 The court held that "due process requires that selections
among applicants be made in accordance with 'ascertainable standards,'
...

and, in cases where many candidates are equally qualified under

these standards, that further selections be made in some reasonable
manner such as 'by lot or on the basis of the chronological order of
application.' ,,46

Although the Holmes opinion was quite properly written in terms
of due process, it could also have been properly written in terms of a
non-delegation doctrine. Either way, the key factor is not the failure
of the statute to control or guide the determination of which applications to grant or deny; the key factor is the administrative failure to
control or guide that determination. The court's assumption was entirely sound that absence of either a substantive or a procedural system in the statutory framework would be permissible if the administrators provided such a system. So the court might properly have held
that the delegation was unlawful unless or until the requisite procedural and substantive system was worked out through administrative
action.
46
An earlier case-a rather important one-was Hornsby v. Allen.
The suit was for deprivation of civil rights under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201,
on the ground that the mayor and aldermen of Atlanta had denied an
application for a liquor license on the basis of "a system of ward courtesy" 47 under which licenses were granted only upon approval of one
or more aldermen of the ward. The court declared: "The public has
the right to expect its officers to observe prescribed standards and to
43
44
45
46

Id. at 264.
Id.

Id. at 265.
326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). A still earlier case is United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d
733, 742 (5th Cir. 1963): "The testimony of the Registrars reveals that they have no set
standard for the 'grading' of questionnaires. . .. The Board [of Registrars] . . must
adopt uniform objective standards."
47 326 F.2d at 607.
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make adjudications on the basis of merit.... [A]bsolute and uncontrolled discretion invites abuse." 48 The idea comes out quite clearly
that the standards may come from the officers and need not come from
the ordinance. The court repeated this important idea when it made
the vital assertion that the guides may be in rules and regulations:
"If there are too many qualified applicants, then the proper remedy is
for the Board of Aldermen to adopt reasonable rules and regulations
which will raise the standards of eligibility or fix limits on the number of licenses which may be issued in an area; the solution is not to
make arbitrary selections among those qualified. .

.

. If it develops

that no ascertainable standards have been established by the Board of
Aldermen by which an applicant can intelligently seek to qualify for
a license, then the court must enjoin the denial of licenses under the
prevailing system and until a legal standard is established and49procedural due process provided in the liquor store licensing field.",
Again, although the court was thinking in terms of due process, it
might properly have held the delegation unlawful unless rules and
regulations supplied the standards of eligibility. Due process and nondelegation seem to merge.
Another such case-an especially good one-is Smith v. Ladner.50 A
statute conferred on the Governor absolute power, with no guides or
standards, to grant or deny non-profit corporate charters. Instead of
holding that the statutory delegation of what the court properly called
"absolute and arbitrary discretion" 51 was valid, and instead of holding
that it was invalid for lack of either safeguards or standards, the court
granted relief on the ground that "neither the statute nor any administrative regulation provides any constitutionally sufficient procedure
for the denial of charters." 52 The clear implication is that an administrative regulation establishing procedural safeguards and providing
standards to guide discretion could correct the deficiencies. If so, Smith
v. Ladner may be a harbinger of the future. It deserves to be.
The three cases-Holmes, Hornsby, and Ladner-all involve judicial creativeness of the kind that is both natural and timely. Perceptive
judges have long realized the unreality of the requirement of meaning48 Id. at 610.
49 Id. at 610, 612.
50 288 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
51 Id.

at 68.

Id. at 70. The court departed from its theory-the theory here emphasized-wher.
it remarked that "any denial of a charter, otherwise lawful, to the plantiffs under the
statute as presently written violates the Due Process Clause ...." Id. Consistently with
the rest of its opinion, it might well have said that any denial of a charter is a denial
of due process unless the Governor provides adequate standards and safeguards.
52
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ful statutory standards and at the same time have been uneasy about
the extent of unnecessary discretionary power, whether delegated or
undelegated. The judges in the three cases turned away from the unrealism of the non-delegation doctrine, but they felt that justice required judicial intervention to correct the unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power. The handiest tool was due process, and
the easiest means of correction was a judicially-enforced requirement
that the administrators create their own standards. The approach of
the three cases will spread. It should.
Perhaps the non-delegation doctrine will gradually turn into a facet
of due process, as in the three cases. But in the longer term, perhaps
the constitutional base will give way to a common-law base. Either
way, the reality will be that the law requiring administrative development of standards and safeguards to control discretionary power will
be judge-made law. A good deal of our administrative law, much more
than is usually realized, is common law. The uncodified law requiring
administrative findings, for instance, is almost entirely common law, as
is a good deal of the law of judicial review of administrative action.
Probably the law the courts will fashion to require administrators to
develop standards, principles, and rules to confine discretionary power
should be subject to legislative change; if so, the courts might well regard it as common law rather than as constitutional law.
The ideal, which probably can never be fully achieved, was stated
by the Supreme Court in 1886 in the great case of Yick Wo v. Hop53
kins:
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are
supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean
to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power.... For, the very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of his living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails .... "
53 118 US. 356.

64 Id. at 369-70.

